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FINAL JUDGMENT: MY LIFE AS A SOVIET DEFENSE ATTORNEY. By 
.Dina Kaminskaya. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1982. Pp. 364. 
$18.95. 
A fair-minded, if undiscriminating, individual might occasion-
ally ask: What real difference is there between the United States and 
the Soviet Union? For every Afghanistan, it seems, there is a Gre-
nada. In the domestic sphere, whenever the Soviets pack one more 
dissident off to a labor camp, critics can note that America's hands 
are not entirely clean: witness, for example, the atrocities of the Mc-
Carthy era or the machinations of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI. For one 
troubled by such comparisons, Dina Kaminskaya's Final Judgment 
can help put matters into perspective and illustrate one important 
distinction between the two societies. And for one who already rec-
ognizes that distinction, Final Judgment is a useful reminder of the 
relative ease with which a totalitarian state can tum truth into false-
hood and falsehood into truth. 
Kaminskaya draws on her thirty-seven years as a Soviet defense 
attorney, or "advocate," to give the reader rare insight not only into 
the nature of the Soviet legal system, but also into the nature of So-
viet society generally. She chose to become an advocate rather than 
a prosecutor partly because of her distaste for the severity of Soviet 
criminal punishments (p. 23) and partly because of the less stringent 
state control exercised over the advocacy profession, which is offi-
cially termed a "self-governing social organization" (p. 24). Unlike 
practically all other workers in the Soviet Union, Soviet advocates 
are not employees of the state (p. 24). Like any other Soviet organi-
zation, however, the advocacy profession must coordinate its work 
with appropriate bodies of the government and the Soviet Commu-
nist Party (p. 25). 1 Still, this relatively relaxed degree of state and 
Party control does not prevent an advocate from making a conscien-
tious and spirited defense of the accused in a normal criminal case. 
Formidable obtacles to the presentation of an effective defense, 
however, are posed by the nature of the Soviet criminal process. In 
1. The central role of the Co=unist Party in Soviet life is established by the Soviet 
Constitution: 
The Co=unist Party of the Soviet Union shall be the guiding and directing force of 
Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and state and social organizations. 
The CPSU shall exist for the people and shall serve the people. 
Armed with Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Co=unist Party shall determine the gen-
eral perspective of the development of society and the internal and foreign policy line of 
the USSR, direct the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and impart a planned, 
scientifically well-founded character to its struggle for the triumph of co=unism. 
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 6, reprinted in I w. BUTLER, COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE USSR 
AND CONSTITUENT UNION REPUBLICS, USSR 1-1, at 5 (1980). 
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Soviet jurisprudence, a criminal trial is the culmination of a legal 
process that begins with an extended investigation by the procuracy 
(prosecution), police, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, sometimes, 
the KGB (p. 51). Once the investigation is completed and an indict-
ment compiled, the judicial process begins (p. 51 ). The pretrial func-
tions of defense counsel are limited by law primarily to a study of 
the documentary material and the planning of defense tactics with 
the accused (p. 53). The advocate may also make requests for sup-
plementary investigation, the calling and questioning of witnesses, 
arranging confrontations, and the provision of further expert evi-
dence (p. 53). However, the investigator, rather than the court, may 
deny such requests and, not surprisingly, usually does (p. 53). At 
trial, while the prosecution and defense are theoretically equal, the 
preeminent status of the prosecutor generally makes itself apparent 
in the deference accorded to him as the state's representative of the 
court (p. 35). By way of explanation, Kaminskaya notes that the 
Soviet judiciary, while nominally independent, actually adheres to 
governmental and Party directives on penal policy (p. 56), a fact not 
startling in light of the control that the Party has over the selection of 
judges (p. 57). In practice, then, the Soviet criminal trial is merely a 
confirmation of the state-controlled investigation that led to the in-
dictment of tb.e accused. 
Nonetheless, little incentive exists for any system wantonly to ig-
nore the innocence of an individual charged with a non-political 
crime,2 and Kaminskaya's description of a rape case that she han-
dled, labelled "The Case of the Two Boys" (pp. 65-157), illustrates 
that the defense, along with justice, can triumph from time to time 
(though it took three separate trials in the case noted). Moreover, 
although one might reasonably argue that criminal procedures in 
most western countries, including the United States, are substantially 
fairer because of their greater protections for the defendant,3 such a 
claim necessarily assumes that conviction of the innocent is a greater 
evil than absolution of the guilty. Most in the West probably agree 
that it is, but the fact that Soviet jurisprudence may take the opposite 
view need not ineluctably lead to the moral condemnation of Soviet 
society. 
Condemnation should follow, however, from the Soviet Union's 
2. A major exception to this statement was Stalin's use of arbitrary arrests of innocent 
individuals to maintain his political control through terror. This practice has been eloquently 
and painstakingly chronicled in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's epic work, The Gulag Archipelago. 
See A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1973); cf. F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925) 
(novel about clerk who never learned of the charges for which he was arrested, tried, con-
victed, and executed.) 
3. Of course, these protections might not be as great as some believe. See, e.g., Amster-
dam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 785 
(1970); Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Proce-
dure, in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU, & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (1965). 
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systematic suppression of political dissent. If the abstract notion of 
"freedom" has any concrete element, it lies in the ability of a citizen 
to voice an opinion at variance with the position of his or her gov-
ernment. While the oft-repeated observation that Soviet citizens 
lack such freedom may seem trite to some, Kaminskaya's description 
of her defense of political offenders (pp. 161-319) demonstrates that 
it remains a compelling truth. 
Kaminskaya represented dissidents such as Yurii Galanskov 
(tried with Alexander Ginsburg) and Vladimir Bukovsky in their 
struggles to induce the Soviet state to recognize legitimate human 
rights. She did so not necessarily because she agreed with their 
cause (though she often did) (pp. 37-38), or because she had any 
hope of changing the predetermined result of their trials (p. 49), but 
because she saw her action as a moral imperative that would play "a 
part in developing a respect for the law among Soviet people" (p. 
50). The Soviet Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, of 
course.4 However, no Soviet court, even if it were so inclined, may 
declare a law unconstitutional (p. 50). This leaves an advocate repre-
senting a political offender charged, for example, with anti-Soviet 
agitation and propaganda,5 with one argument - that his or her cli-
ent's conduct did not fall within the statute's proscription. And, as 
Kaminskaya makes clear, this is not an argument that will succeed 
where the KGB has conducted the investigation. 
One might respond to such observations with examples of how 
other governments, including local and federal authorities in the 
United States, have similarly abused the legal process. However, 
few do so as systematically, consistently, and effectively as the Soviet 
4. In accordance with the interests of the working people and with a view to strengthen-
ing the socialist system, citizens of the USSR shall be guaranteed the freedom of: speech, 
press, assembly, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations. 
The realization of these political freedoms shall be ensured by granting public build-
ings, streets and squares, extensive dissemination of information, and the possibility of 
using the press, television, and radio to the working people and their organizations. 
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 50, reprinted in I W. BUTLER, COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE USSR 
AND CONSTITUENT UNION REPUBLICS, USSR 1-1, at 17 (1980). 
5. The crime of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and its punishment are defined in 
the Soviet criminal code: 
Agitation or propaganda conducted for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet 
authority or of committing individual especially dangerous crimes against the state, the 
spreading for the same purposes of slanderous fabrication defaming the Soviet state and 
social system, and equally the spreading or manufacture or keeping for the same purposes 
of literature of such content, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of 
from six months to seven years and with or without exile for a term of from two to five 
years or by exile for a term of from two to five years. 
The same actions committed by a person previously convicted for especially danger-
ous crimes against the state, and equally committed in wartime, shall be punished by 
deprivation of freedom for a term of from three to ten years and with or without exile for 
a term of from two to five years. 
LAW ON CRIMINAL REsPONSlBILITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE art. 7, reprinted in IV 
W. BUTLER, COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND CONSTITUENT UNION REPUBLICS, 
VII-8, at 5-6 (1979). 
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Union, a fact dramatically underscored by Kaminskaya's book. In a 
country such as the United States, alternative non-governmental 
sources of information exist that can at least attempt to ferret out 
corrupt practices and expose them to the light of public opinion 
(and, it is hoped, generally do). In the Soviet Union, the dissemina-
tion of information is a perquisite of the Party and the government 
bodies that it controls. A concomitant of this difference is that in a 
country like the United States, political change occurs: unpopular 
views may become, if not widely accepted, at least acceptable. In the 
Soviet Union, political change occurs only as decreed from on high 
by the Party, and any incipient movements outside of the Party's 
purview are crushed as soon as their shoots break through the soil of 
societal conformity.6 The difference in the relative abilities of the 
American and Soviet governments to shape internal perceptions of 
reality to their liking distinguishes the two societies, a distinction 
that may make a difference to those concerned about things such as 
freedom and truth. 
In 1977 Dina Kaminskaya and her husband, Konstantine Simis, 
were expelled from the Soviet Union.7 Kaminskaya writes: "Often I 
am asked to name the principal, immediate cause of the KGB's pres-
sure on us and the subsequent demand that we leave the Soviet 
Union. I never know how to answer that question, or which particu-
lar cause to single out. Our whole life was the cause . . ." (p. 346). 
One hopes that it was not a cause taken up in vain. 
6. Thus, even groups whose aims are consistent with official Soviet policy, but which are 
organized outside of official channels, are not tolerated by the Soviet regime. See, e.g., N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 9, 1982, § 1, at 7, col. 4 (leader of independent Soviet peace group reportedly held 
in psychiatric hospital and administered depressant drugs against his will). 
7. The expulsion ofKaminskaya and Sirois followed her disqualification as an advocate in 
political trials and the discovery of a manuscript written by him. Sirois' book was published in 
the United States in 1982 under the title of USSR· The Corrupt Society. 
